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JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE OF JURIES
IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
Peter H. Schuck*
The jury casts an immense shadow over mass tort litigation. On this
point, at least, all of the participants-plaintiffs' and defendants' law-
yers, their clients, jurors, judges, and commentators-seem to agree.1
Plaintiffs and their lawyers are probably the most ardent advocates
of the jury trial, at least in their public statements. They ostenta-
tiously maintain that they have total confidence in juries and want
nothing more than to get their cases before them. If they can only do
so, they assert, the jury will find the plaintiffs' grievous sufferings to be
compelling, their claims meritorious, and their corporate opponents
culpable, if not criminal. Plaintiffs' lawyers especially value juries in
mass tort litigation where, almost by definition, the compensatory
damages may be quite large. Although punitive damages are rare,2
especially in mass torts, they are always an alluring possibility to plain-
tiffs' lawyers, especially where incriminating corporate documents can
be unearthed and paraded before the jury. In a single stroke, then,
the mass tort jury can render justice to the plaintiffs and enrich their
lawyers.
Regardless of what plaintiffs' lawyers say in public, however, most
would strongly prefer to settle. After all, even the credible threat of a
jury trial can induce mass tort defendants to settle before trial,
thereby enabling plaintiffs to gain their judgments and the lawyers to
obtain their fees (and also to burnish their reputations in ways that
translate into greater bargaining power with future clients and defend-
ants) without incurring the high costs of trial and the substantial risks
of defendant verdicts or reversal on appeal,3
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which carries enormous normative force in American legal and political culture).
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3. Although good data on this question are lacking, defendants appear to be successful in
many, possibly even most, of the mass tort cases that go to trial. In this respect, asbestos cases in
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